Wittgenstein and Ethical Supervenience
مجله اخلاق پزشکی - علمی پژوهشی,
دوره 2 شماره 5 (1387),
28 تیر 2016
,
صفحه 65-75
https://doi.org/10.22037/mej.v2i5.12189
چکیده
In this, paper, I am going to present an argument in favour of generalism and criticise the particularistic position in moral reasoning... According to generalism which is associated with supervenience, the way in which a morlly relevant feature contributes to the moral evaluation of different contexts is patternable. However, a particularist like Dancy utilizes the very idea of resultance instead of supervenience to give an account of how a non-moral feature behaves in different contexts. An account drawn from Wittgenstein with regard to the nature of concepts is presented here to criticise the particulristic position while endorsing the very idea of supervenience and the generilistic position with regard to the extent of the patternability of the reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant feature in different contexts.
- Wittgenstein
- Ethical supervenience
- generalism
- particularistic
ارجاع به مقاله
مراجع
-Dancy, J (1981) ‘On Moral Properties’, Mind, 90, pp, 367-385, 380-382 & (1993) Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 73-79.
-Dancy, J. (2004) Ethics without Principles (Oxford: Oxfors University Press).
-Rnnow-Rasmussen, T. (1999) ‘Particularism and Principles’, Theoria, 65, pp.114-126.
-Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (1999) ‘Some Varieties of Particularism’, Metaphilosophy, 30, pp. 1-12, 2-5.
-Wittgenstein, L.(1953) Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell).
- چکیده مشاهده شده: 232 بار