A Critical Examination of Fukuyama's View on Human Genetic Enhancement from an Ethical Perspective
Akhlāq-i zīstī i.e., Bioethics Journal,
Vol. 16 No. 41 (1405),
19 June 2026
,
Page 1-13
https://doi.org/10.22037/bioeth.v16i41.50880
Abstract
Background and Aim: Humans have always sought to improve their quality of life, health, and abilities. Recent advances in genetic engineering have enabled genetic interventions to unprecedentedly improve human capabilities and characteristics and overcome human limitations. Significant developments in biomedical sciences and technologies have made human genetic improvement one of the main issues of applied ethics. The use of genetic technology to improve human characteristics and capacities has encountered opposition. The argument based on human nature is the best-known and strongest argument against genetic improvement. Francis Fukuyama is among the people who presented this argument. In this article, Fukuyama's argument is examined and criticized from an ethical perspective.
Methods: The research method is descriptive-analytical, and data collection was carried out in a library manner.
Ethical Considerations: Honesty and trustworthiness have been observed in writing this article.
Findings: Francis Fukuyama is a strong opponent of genetic engineering and the improvement of human genetic capabilities. In his view, advances in biotechnology change nature and human nature. Human nature includes the most fundamental and pervasive characteristics of the human species, which are genetically derived rather than being influenced by environmental factors, and are the fundamental origin of moral sense, social skills, and philosophical thinking. Fukuyama ultimately distinguishes between treatment and improvement of human capacities and allows the use of biotechnology only for the treatment of genetic diseases. The inability to provide a precise definition of nature, ignoring biotechnological limitations, the lack of a difference between improvement and treatment, the ineffectiveness of the concept of human nature in the ethical analysis of human genetic improvement, and the criterion of human nature as a criterion for determining the ethical and unethical aspects of genetic improvement are among the most important drawbacks of Fukuyama's argument.
Conclusion: Francis Fukuyama's argument faces serious flaws and lacks sufficient credibility. Therefore, he cannot prove the immorality of using genetic engineering to improve human capacities by reasoning based on nature and human nature.
- Human genetic improvement
- Francis Fukuyama
- Human nature
- Applied ethics
How to Cite
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